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ABSTRACT 
Efficiency is loosely measured by accounting for the levels of productivity and costs involved for 
labor. This paper seeks to lay out the efficiency of the labor market during the height of the 
USSR’s command system economy. Various literature on the subject argues that, contrary to 
common knowledge, the Soviet Union had an efficient economy. To effectively measure 
efficiency, this paper first examines the characteristics of the Soviet labor market from 1922-
1991 and highlights important topics of productivity, employment, and resource allocation. The 
features of the labor market and links to Marxist ideology are continually referenced throughout 
this analysis. Finally, this paper compares the labor market trends of the USSR with the trends of 
modern-day capitalist economies.  
  
I. INTRODUCTION  
It seems to be the case that when we think about the Soviet Union’s command economy, 
we tend to overlook the characteristics of the system, and merely jump to recognizing the fact 
that the system quickly failed. However, this paper offers the chance to explore the intriguing 
complexity of the Soviet economic system, more specifically, its labor market. One of the most 
interesting facts about the USSR’s command economy was the way labor productivity was 
valued. An analysis of the labor market opens a conversation that goes beyond an economic 
framework, given that within the socialist regime, the labor market is greatly influenced by 
cultural and political factors. Therefore, measuring efficiency of the Soviet Union’s labor market 
requires a thorough analysis of the values and strategies of the State. 
Finding official government information on the labor market proved more difficult than 
expected, this is because the USSR preferred not to release information that only attached 
economic value to its labor productivity. Following Marxist ideology, the labor of the people 
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should not be exploited for economic profits. In an attempt to maintain the belief system on 
which the Soviet Union was founded upon, the characteristics of the labor market were discussed 
through a “socialist planning” approach. The term “Labor Market '' is a foreign idea to the Soviet 
regime, rather they used the phrase “planned distribution of the labor force” in various literature 
when considering what we know as the labor market. Although there are considerable 
differences in economic terminology used by socialist systems compared to our capitalist system, 
we are still able to quantify the efficiency of the labor market. 
  
II. BACKGROUND/LITERATURE REVIEW 
         To effectively display the efficiency of the Soviet Union’s Labor Market, it is imperative 
to look at the places where it is inefficient. Without the existence of market prices, central 
planners do not have a grasp of the opportunity costs of factors of production. Another issue that 
comes up within socialist countries is the inability to develop or adopt technology. The most 
influential paper on this topic is “The Labor Market and the Transition of Socialist Economies” 
by Milan Vodopivec, published in the Country Economics Department of the World Bank. This 
paper investigates the labor markets of socialist economies to predict how well they may 
transition into multiparty democracies. Vodopivec analyzes the USSR and countries in Eastern 
Europe that adopted similar systems. He dedicates a great amount of time to understanding how 
the adoption of Marxist ideology is projected onto a state that wants to maximize its productivity. 
Importantly, Vodopivec underlines that there is room for comparison between the labor market 
of socialist and capitalist regimes. For example, the labor market in socialist countries is roughly 
comparable in mobility with developed market economies (7). This ties into my work of 
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describing the strategies for increased productivity that the USSR adopted, and how efficient 
these were at maintaining strong administrative rule and an adequate growth rate. 
         A key topic that I study is wages and the distribution of manpower in the Soviet Labor 
market. This is an incredibly interesting topic because, as mentioned before, the socialist regime 
refused to adopt economic terminology that implied that wages were the price paid for labor. 
Therefore, the wages given to laborers and the jobs performed by them were expressed in a way 
that signaled a mutually beneficial relationship between the worker and the state. “The Soviet 
Labor Market” by Emily Clarke Brown, published by Sage, takes on an analysis of this 
relationship between central planning and the labor force. Brown explains the ideology behind 
the way payment is distributed and the strategies employed by the government in managing their 
labor force. The socialist economic system was very averse to the equalization of wages, and 
they did not correctly value the differences between skilled and unskilled labor. Through an 
analysis of Soviet government and the workers, this paper displays the areas where there was 
much lost productivity due to administrative inefficiency. 
         Another characteristic that is imperative to analyze is the productivity of the Soviet 
Union labor market. This not only deals with the subject of promoting economic profits, but of 
measuring standards of living and relationship of the labor market with other sectors of society, 
such as the housing market. Productivity is also heavily discussed when displaying the widely 
known shortages of goods that the USSR suffered from. “Labor Productivity in the Soviet 
Union” by Irving H. Siegel for The Journal of the American Statistical Association, takes on a 
purely economic look at measuring industrial productivity and gross output. This article displays 
the average productivity of workers in varying industries- something that Soviet officials rarely 
measured. Taking the economic information that is examined by Siegel and comparing it to the 
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cultural and political studies that may be performed on this subject allows for an efficient 
observation of Soviet standards of living and the strength of their social relations. 
         The inefficiency of the Soviet regime to adequately measure and promote productivity 
was soon evident to the public sphere when the Soviet Union began suffering from both labor 
and consumer goods shortages. These events were catastrophic to the soviet economy as they 
could no longer conceal their loss of societal and economic control. The book, “Hard Times: 
Impoverishment and Protest in the Perestroika Years” by William Moskoff, details the effect that 
price volatility had on Soviet citizens. This book compares the income of laborers, food prices, 
and black-market prices to portray the events that led up to final loss of power of the Soviet 
Regime.  
III. HOW THE LABOR MARKET OPERATES 
a. Wages and the Distribution of Manpower 
As previously stated, the Soviet Union denies that wages are specifically the price of 
labor, or the result of a market transaction. The provision of manpower takes place by central 
planning and organized distribution, because of this, we expect wages to have no place in a 
conversation about the distribution of the labor force. As stated by Emily Brown, “the reward for 
work in the USSR is therefore not the price of labor power, but represents the part of the share of 
the social product which is distributed among workers in proportion to the quantity and quality 
of labor expanded” (182). Soviet officials expressed that pay rates were “according to work”, 
meaning that workers received different wages depending on differences in effort, working 
conditions, and living costs in differing areas. Although the labor market is purposely loosely 
defined, it is comparable to the labor markets that we presently know. Differential wages were 
used to promote employment and influence workers to stay in desired jobs depending on their 
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skill levels and costs of training. By working wherever the government preferred, individuals 
were presented with the opportunity for economic advancement. 
Central plans set limits on the number of workers and wage funds for industries, setting 
wage differentials. This heavy focus on wage differentials eliminated the idea of wage 
equalization and of valuing work based on where it was skilled or unskilled. The result were 
higher wages for those in the branches of heavy industrial work such as mining and 
manufacturing. A high demand for industrial goods, and high wages in that sector served to 
further influence the economic prosperity of the Soviet Union. Wage differentials for skill were 
divided into eight “labor grades”. The lowest of these labor grades paid 1.26 rubles hourly while 
the highest payed 3.08. Research has shown that this system was successful in influencing 
citizens to expand their skill levels so that they could be transferred to higher ranks.  
 
b. Employment 
The placement of individual workers in jobs has occurred through a combination of 
individual choice and compulsion. One of the features that the Soviet state was most proud of 
was that they had no unemployment, and in fact, lacked enough workers in rapidly developing 
skilled-work industries. The labor market mostly relied on individual choice of employment, as 
Soviet citizens had the constitutional “right to work” followed by the “duty to work.” Individual 
choice was aided through employment agencies that sought to direct employees to where they 
were most productive and placed graduates in skilled positions. Regarding compulsory work, the 
state revered the right to force citizens to labor in times of crisis where they would be “fighting 
the elements or lack or workers to carry out important state work” (Labor Code of 1918). During 
WWII, for example, conscription was used for both the industry and agriculture. 
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 Figure 1 displays the channels used for hiring workers in all sectors of the economy in 
1970 and in 1980. It can be noted that the rates of hiring increased significantly in all channels 
expect direct enterprise hiring. This table also depicts the importance that the Soviet economy 
placed on acquiring more university graduates for skilled labor.  
 
 
 
IV. LABOR MARKET INEFFICIENCY (allocative and dynamic) 
Allocative efficiency concerns the ability of an economy to efficiently allocate inputs. An 
economy is allocatively efficient if given a level of technology, no gains can be made if 
production factors are shifted. It is interesting to note that an economy can be allocatively 
efficient and yet be inside the PPF, due to technical inefficiency. There has been a lack of 
consensus regarding whether the Soviet Union was allocatively efficient, with much of the 
discussion rooting from disagreements on the validity of Soviet economic data. In “An Economic 
History of the USSR”, Alec Nove underlines the overwhelming success of the Soviet economy 
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in terms of growth, increases in productivity, and raising the potential living standards. He states 
the eventual economic failure of the USSR was not due to a too much socialism, rather, because 
it was not socialist enough. His work displays that due to statistical mistakes in the recollection 
and interpretation of data, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the Soviet 
economy was much higher than is commonly believed. Contrary to scholars who argue that the 
USSR was unable to replace labor with machinery and make a switch from labor-intensive to 
capital-intensive production, Nove appeals to data that shows that the ratio of this replacement of 
labor by capital may have been in fact quite high.  
The article “Estimation of Output Loss from Allocative Inefficiency” by Whitesell and 
Barreto follows a similar narrative This paper presents two different estimates of the output loss 
resulting from allocative inefficiency in the Soviet Union and the United States. The result of 
examining nine industrial sectors during 1960 and 1984 shoes that there are only small 
differences in allocative inefficiency between the United States and Soviet economies. Whitesell 
and Barreto understand that there is a lack of agreement over whether studies on the Soviet 
Union are based on reliable data, yet they offer a plausible explanation for the unexpectedly 
strong performance of the USSR’s economy in the allocation of labor and capital across sectors. 
They argue that, there were low levels of resource misallocation and conclude that the poor 
economic standing of the Soviet Union was a result of technical inefficiency and production of 
the wrong mix of output.  
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a. Inefficient Allocation of Labor 
The use of hiring channels to accommodate the wage differential system proved to be 
quite difficult to manage. Simatupang (1982) reports that the proportion of employees with 
higher technical education in the nonagricultural sector is much higher in the USSR than in 
western countries. Unskilled and skilled laborers were wrongfully placed in sectors where they 
would not reach their productivity potential, the extent of the economic impact of this fault is 
unknown but present. Moreover, to increase wages under regulation schemes, enterprises would 
hire large amounts of unskilled workers so that skilled labor increased in value. This 
phenomenon displays a lack of labor market management by the Soviet regime. In general, the 
labor mobility that was so prevalent in the regime may have not improved the efficiency of labor 
allocation. As explained by Milan Vodopivec, “If value marginal product in firm A does not 
equal value marginal product in firm B, welfare could be increased by reallocating labor from the 
less productive to the more productive use. But if both firms pay the same wage rate, workers 
themselves have no incentive to change employers such direct administrative measures are 
ineffective” (32). If the wage does not reflect the opportunity cost of labor, then reallocation is 
not worth it, and it was most likely the case that soviet workers were reallocating based on false 
promise of increased opportunities.  
V. MODERN DAY REFLECTION 
The labor market of the Soviet Union followed a nearly thirty-year series of trial and error 
under the Five-Year Plans. I find it critical to point out that although the regime was created 
under the ideas of Marxism and Leninism, there was no preexisting “economic blueprint” that 
the Soviet Union was to follow. Soviet central planning and controlled economic development 
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resulted in full employment and huge movements of labor into new sectors. The impressively 
fast shift from an agricultural society to an industrial power was driven by ideology and 
economic ambition, yet blindly left room for inefficiencies to occur within the system. The 
adoption of characteristics of our modern-day labor market, such as the recognition of skilled 
and unskilled labor, would have largely benefited the Soviet regime. The labor market also 
suffered from a lack of oversight by officials that were to ensure that parties would not alter the 
hiring process to benefit themselves or others. As mentioned in section IV, scholars find that the 
inefficiency that the Soviet Union suffered from was caused mostly by technical inefficiency in 
management of production.  
 Nonetheless, much of the differences that are present between the economy of the USSR and 
modern-day economies like that of the United States, are solely based of differences in 
terminology. What I often found in the scholarly literature, was the idea that the eventual fall of 
the Soviet Union was not because it was too socialist, rather, it adopted a twisted idea of 
socialism that best benefited the elite in power. In actuality, we do not know whether a truly 
socialist USSR would have socially and economically prospered.  
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